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ABSTRACT

A SOCIAL COGNITIVE MODEL OF DETECTING DECEPTION
MAY 2001
JAMES A. FORREST, B.A., FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Ph D
•

.

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

,

Directed by: Robert
In this dissertation,

S.

Feldman

three studies investigate

how a person's beliefs about the cues that indicate

deception are related to actual accuracy in detecting
deception.

Based on social cognition research, it was

hypothesized that people with accurate beliefs about
the cues that predict deception are better at detecting

deception only when those beliefs are cognitively
available and activated.

In contrast, without

activation of appropriate beliefs, detection will be no

better than for those with inaccurate beliefs.
Study

I

tested this hypothesis in a laboratory

study, where participants viewed video fragments of

people who are either being honest or dishonest.

A

questionnaire measured participants' beliefs and the

activation of these beliefs was accomplished by

manipulating suspicion.

Study

I

provided clear

evidence for the main hypothesis, where suspicious

v

participants who had accurate beliefs were
better at
detecting deception compared to other
participants.
In Study II,

a modified belief questionnaire was

administered to 669 undergraduate participants in order
to have a better understanding of the attributes
of a

scale that attempts to measure people's beliefs about
the cues that predict deception.

Study III attempted to conceptually replicate

Study

I

in a field study.

Undergraduate participants

watched a video of actual passengers who either were or
were not attempting to pass contraband past an
experimenter.

This study did not show the same pattern

of results as Study

I,

but did show that suspicious

participants were better at detecting deception.
Study IV attempted to teach and activate the

beliefs about cues that predict deception.

Either

correct or incorrect beliefs were taught to the

participants and participants' involvement was
manipulated.

The main test of the hypothesis in this

study did not show an increase in accuracy for

participants who were highly involved and given the
correct cues, but indirect evidence suggest that belief

accuracy may be related to participant's detection
accuracy.
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CHAPTER

I

A SOCIAL COGNITIVE MODEL OF DETECTING DECEPTION

Introduction

Accurately detecting deception is an important
abili ty that not only benefits law officers and other

criminal justice professionals on the job, but laypersons
as well

(e.g.,

1980)

For example, detectives need to separate the

.

Ekman,

1985; DePaulo,

1994; Kraut & Poe,

trustworthy from the untrustworthy statements made by
witnesses.

Similarly,

in legal cases,

judges and juries

must be able to accurately identify honest testimony from

perjurious testimony.

For laypersons, the ability to

detect deception may help in avoiding unpleasant

situations such as being taken in by the claims of an

unscrupulous salesperson.
Despite the apparent usefulness of being able to
detect deception accurately (and presumably the ample

opportunity to practice such skills)

,

one would expect

that people generally would be good lie detectors, but

this is not the case.

Various researchers have

consistently found that people are able to detect
deception at a rate only slightly above chance level

1

.

.

(DePaulo,

1999; Miller & Burgoon,

1981; Knapp & Comoneda,

1979)

Although it seems that criminal justice
professionals should be better at detecting deception,
research findings suggest that experts are no more
adept
at detecting deception than lay persons, except
for a few

isolated groups (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991)
Vrij and Semin (1996)

.

Furthermore,

showed that expert lie detectors

such as customs officers, police detectives, prison
guards,

and non-experts had erroneous -- and similar --

beliefs about which behaviors indicate deception in
others
Some research has attempted to identify the people

who are good detectors of deceit based on particular

personality factors and other individual differences
(DePaulo & Tang,

1994), but there has been little success

in this endeavor

(see DePaulo,

DePaulo,

1994 for review)

.

Stone,

& Lassiter,

1985;

For example, meta-analyses

have not found any systematic gender differences in the

ability to detect deception (DePaulo, Epstein,
1993),

& Wyer,

and the evidence for personality factors that

predict a person's ability to detect deception is mixed
(Keating & Heltman,

1994; DePaulo & Tang,

2

1994).

D istinguishing Be tween Accurate
and Inaccurate Lie

Detectors

Although the results of recent studies do not

provide individual difference criteria to use
in
distinguishing between good lie detectors and poor
lie
detectors, we do know that some people are simply
better

detectors of deception than others are.

For example,

Ekman and O'Sullivan (1991) found that Secret Service
agents were significantly better than others at detecting
deception.

Another study by Frank and Ekman (1996)

showed that people who are good at detecting deception in
one context are also good at detecting deception in other
contexts.

These findings suggest that there are people

who are good at picking up the cues that predict

deception and using that information to accurately decode
deception.

The problem we face is identifying these

people and understanding why they are good at detecting
deception, while the majority of people are relatively

poor at it.

Attributions of Deceptiveness
One line of research that has addressed this

question has concentrated on assessing cues that people

actually use when attempting to detect deception (Kraut,
1978; Kraut & Poe,

1980; Vri j

,

1993).

The basic

assumption is that the attribution about deception that a

3

,

person (the judge) makes is linked to
other attributions
relating to the person being judged for
deception
(target),

such as how nervous the target seems, untidy

dressing (Vrij & Winkel, 1993), and less smiling
on the
part of the target (Vrij,

1993).

Consequently, if a

judge's attributions correspond to cues that in
general

predict deception, then the person should be more

accurate in detecting deception.

Attribution studies usually measure the nonverbal
behaviors of the persons being judged (target persons)
who are being either truthful or untruthful, and also

measure judges' attributions for various aspects of the

way the targets come across, including how truthful each
target person seems.

For example, Kraut

(1978)

found

that expert lie detectors relied heavily on the

plausibility of a story when forming an impression about
how deceptive a target person was.

It is not clear from

the research the degree of awareness that people have

about the processes that they use to detect deception.
This line of research has given us a greater

understanding of the way people attribute deception to
others.

One drawback of this approach is that no

causality can be established.

That is,

it is not known

if the attribution of plausibility affects the way a

person attributes deceptiveness, or if the attribution of

4

deceptiveness affects how plausible a story
seems, or if
some other unmeasured factor mediates
the relationship.
Belief Accuracy

Another line of research has concentrated on the
beliefs that judges have about which behaviors
predict
deception.

This research stems from various studies on

the nonverbal behaviors that people actually enact when

they are deceiving or attempting to deceive (DePaulo,
1992; DePaulo, et al
In addition,

.

1985;

,

Zuckerman, & Driver; 1985).

this line of research assumes that accurate

beliefs about the cues that predict deception should lead
to better detection.

A meta-analysis by DePaulo and colleagues finds that

attempted deception is correlated with behaviors such as
increased speech disturbances, higher-pitched voice,
longer latency period, slower speech rate, and decreased
leg and arm movement

(DePaulo,

meta-analyses have provided

a

et al

.

,

1985)

.

These

starting point for research

concerning the beliefs that people have about the cues
that predict deception.
In a study performed in the Netherlands, Vrij and

Semin (1996) compared the beliefs that purportedly expert
lie detectors

(police officers), college students, and

convicted criminals have regarding the nonverbal
behaviors that indicate deception.

5

Surprisingly, they

.

found that police officers and college
students have

similar

--

and incorrect -- beliefs about the
nonverbal

indicators of deception, but that convicted
criminals had
somewhat more accurate beliefs.

They also found that

more successful officers (those officers who
had made the
most arrests) did not have more accurate beliefs.

Although the research on the belief structure of lie
detectors is based on the idea that more accurate beliefs
should lead to better lie detection, these researchers
did not investigate the possible link between belief and

judgment of deception in an experimental setting.
Belief Structure and Deception Detection Accuracy

Although research has examined people's beliefs
about cues associated with deception, only one published

study has investigated the effects of beliefs people hold
on their accuracy in detecting deception (Anderson et
al

.

,

1999)

In this study,

participants (senders) were

honest and dishonest to same-sex friends (judges)

.

Each

judge then identified when he or she thought the sender
was being honest and dishonest.

Judges also identified

the cues they used in order to make their decision about

deceptiveness.

The cues mentioned were coded into

verbal, visual, and paralinguist ic cues.

The results of

this study showed that judges could not distinguish

between true and fabricated stories on the explicit

6

,

measure of deceptiveness.

Nevertheless, judges mentioned

more verbal cues when the story was
truthful and more

visual cues when the story was fabricated.

Furthermore,

mention of paralinguistic cues was positively
correlated
with accuracy in detecting deception.
This study provides the first tentative evidence
that beliefs about the cues that predict deception are

associated with deception detection accuracy and serves
as a stepping stone for the hypotheses laid out in this

dissertation.

This study provides some evidence for a

cognitive model of deception detection, where there is

a

direct relationship between the beliefs people hold about
the cues that predict deception and their actual accuracy
in detecting deception.

That Anderson and colleagues'

study is the

(1999)

only published investigation on the belief structure of
the person attempting to detect deception is surprising

given that most training methods designed and
investigated by researchers (e.g., Zuckerman et al
1984)

.

assume that more accurate beliefs about behaviors

indicative of deception should facilitate lie detection.
This lack of studies is especially surprising because the

pattern of results of the Anderson et al
are not all that clear.

7

.

(1999)

study

Social-Cognitive F actors in Detecting Deception
Other researchers have investigated
whether various

social-cognitive factors influence accuracy in
detecting

deception (e.g., Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Toris
DePaulo,

1985; Burgoon & Buller,

1994).

&

Some theories

suggest that a judge's social-cognitive motivation may
affect the nonverbal displays and behaviors of senders,
and vice-versa (Burgoon et al

.

1999)

,

.

Most studies

investigating the role of social -cognitive factors

affecting detection accuracy (e.g., Toris & DePaulo,
1985; Forrest & Feldman,

2000)

hypothesize that a

person's motivation changes the way he or she attempts to
detect deception, which may or may not lead to increased

accuracy in detecting deception.

Most probably,

motivators affect both the judge's behaviors and
judgements, and the sender's reciprocal behaviors.

Toris and DePaulo (1985) looked at suspicion as a

possible moderator of accuracy in detecting deception,
suggesting that people who are suspicious should pay more

attention to the relevant cues to deception, and
therefore are more accurate in detecting deception.

Participants acting as "interviewers" interviewed two
"applicants" who were either introverts or extraverts
(measured by the Eysenck Personality Inventory; Eysenck &
Eysenck,

1969)

who presented themselves either as

8

introverts and extraverts; therefore
"applicants" either
gave an honest or dishonest representation
of themselves.
"Interviewers" were either primed to suspect
deception or
were not primed.
It was expected that suspiciousness

would increase accuracy in distinguishing between
the
applicants" who were actually extraverts and introverts.
Surprisingly, this study failed to find a clear

relationship between suspicion and the ability to

distinguish between honest and dishonest representations.
Forrest and Feldman (2000)

investigated the effects

of motivation in a person's accuracy in detecting

deception.

This study showed video fragments of target

persons who were either honest or dishonest to

participants who were either highly motivated to
scrutinize a message or participants who were not highly
motivated.

It was found that people who were highly

motivated were less effective at detecting deception
compared to people who were not highly motivated.
Forrest and Feldman (2000) reasoned that people in
the high involvement condition attended to the behaviors

they thought predict deception, and people in the low

involvement condition used automatic processes to arrive
at their ratings of truthfulness.

If this is the case,

then people in the high involvement condition may have

been less proficient in detecting deception because

9

.

people in general hold erroneous beliefs
about the cues
that predict deception.
Act ivating Beliefs Increases Detection
Accuracy
It is clear that the research has failed
to identify
(a)

the critical factors that would predict who is
and

who is not a good lie detector, and

(b)

the relationship

between the beliefs that people hold and their accuracy
in detecting deception.

The proposed research project

examines the joint effects of suspicion and people's

beliefs about what cues are associated with deception.

Work in social cognition and personality suggests that
correct beliefs about what cues are associated with

deception are useless if those beliefs are not activated
when making a judgment (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Epstein,
Specifically,

1990)

if we activate people's beliefs

about cues associated with deception, and those beliefs
are accurate, people will rely on those beliefs and make

accurate judgments.

On the other hand,

if the beliefs

that are activated are wrong, then people's accuracy in

detecting deception should not be great.
Possible benefits derived from the investigation of
the hypotheses presented in this dissertation should help
in providing needed groundwork for deception detection

training.
(e.g.,

Training methods used in psychological studies

Zuckerman, Koestner,

& Alton,

10

1984; Ansfield,

et

.

al*'

1997

have assumed that deception detection
accuracy

)

should increase simply by teaching
someone which

nonverbal behaviors indicate deception.

Researchers in

this area have found that teaching
people to be better at

detecting deception is not a simple and straightforward
process.

The hypotheses tested in this dissertation

suggest that training methods have ignored a crucial

aspect of the decision making process

--

a

person's

motivation
In order to understand the relationship between a

person's beliefs about the cues that predict deception,
and a person's ability to detect deception, two competing

models were investigated.
investigate

(1)

Specifically, this study will

whether a person's accuracy in the

beliefs about behaviors that indicate deception has a
direct relationship to the accuracy in detecting
deception, or

(2)

whether the relationship between

beliefs and deception detection accuracy is moderated by
a

person's motivation.

That is, do these beliefs have to

be activated in a more direct manner for this

relationship to appear?

If the simple,

(activation of beliefs is not necessary)

direct approach
is correct,

then

training methods designed to help professionals become

better lie detectors should concentrate on what people do
when they attempt to deceive.

11

On the other hand,

if the

.

interaction model (activation of beliefs
is a necessary

condition for accurate detection of
deception) is
correct,

then training methods should concentrate
on both

people's motivators and what behaviors they
should attend
to when attempting to detect deception.

The Present Studies

The overarching hypothesis of the proposed studies
is that people who have accurate beliefs about which
cues

predict deception should be better at detecting deception

compared to people who have inaccurate beliefs.

However,

it is expected that this difference will be apparent only

when the beliefs are activated.
Specifically, Fein (1996) has shown that suspicion

results in more effortful and sophisticated thinking.

Other researchers have also shown that suspicious people

attend more closely to the cues that are associated with

deception compared to people who are not suspicious
(Zuckerman, et al

.

,

1982; DePaulo,

et al

.

,

1982).

Judge's involvement has also been associated with an
increase in attention to verbal cues when judging

deception (Stiff et al

.

,

1989).

Consequently,

it is

expected that suspicion and involvement will activate
people's beliefs about the relevant cues to which they
should attend in order to achieve the goal of being

accurate

12

In Studies

I

and III, it is hypothesized that
the

people who are most accurate at detecting
deception will
be those who are suspicious and have
accurate beliefs

about which cues predict deception.

In the studies,

the

predictions were investigated using laypersons
(college
students) as the ones making the judgments.

Furthermore,

both college students and a sample of airline passengers
at a large international airport were the target persons
in order to extend the generalizability of the results.
In Study IV,

training was given to participants.

This training consisted of presenting judges with

behaviors that either predict or do not predict deception
in order to experimentally manipulate people's beliefs.
In addition,

an involvement manipulation similar to that

used in the Forrest and Feldman (2000) study was used in
order to prime the learned beliefs.

It was expected that

participants who were taught the correct beliefs would be
better at detecting deception, but only when they were

motivated to be accurate.

13

CHAPTER II

STUDY

I

:

WHEN ACCURATE BELIEFS LEAD TO BETTER LIE
DETECTION

Overview
This study tested the hypothesis that people who

have accurate beliefs about the cues that predict

deception are better at detecting deception, but only
when the beliefs are activated.

A questionnaire measured

participant's beliefs about cues predictive of deception.
It was thought that by varying participant's level of

suspicion, activation of beliefs would be manipulated.

Therefore, high levels of suspicion would activate

people's held beliefs about the cues that predict
deception, while low levels of suspicion would not

activate people's beliefs.

Method

Participants
Sixty-eight undergraduates were recruited from

introductory psychology classes and acted as judges.

For

their participation, they were given extra credit in
their introductory course.

Experimental sessions were

performed in groups ranging in size from
at a time.

14

2

to 10 judges

.

Stimulus Material
Judges watched a video consisting of 33
15-second

fragments of

8

men and

8

women being either honest or

dishonest, which lasted approximately 15 minutes.

The

first fragment was used to familiarize the
judges with
the procedure.

These fragments were randomly selected

from a pool of video fragments used in a previous

experiment (Forrest and Feldman, 2000)
The procedure to make the stimulus tape replicates
the procedures outlined by DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, and

O'Brien (1988).

Targets were run one at a time and told

that "the study consisted of people's ability to make

impressions on others in different situations."

First,

the target person was told that the other participant had

not arrived yet, but in the meantime, he or she could
fill out a questionnaire.

While waiting for the other

participant (who was fictitious)

,

the target person was

asked if he or she agreed or disagreed with each of the
four attitude statements.

The statements were:

(1)

death penalty should be instituted in all states;
There is too much violence on television;

power plants are not very safe; and

(4)

(3)

The

(2)

Nuclear

The government

should put further restrictions on immigration.

These

four attitude statements were selected from a larger pool
of statements on the basis of the following criteria:

15

(1)

the mean attitude rating for each
item was close to the

midpoint;

the items were not intercorrelated

(2)

;

and

(

3

)

most people did not regard the issue
described in the
items as "very important" or "very unimportant."

After

2

minutes, the experimenter collected the

questionnaire and handed out a set of instructions.

The

target person read the instructions, which explained that
the aim of the study was to examine the ability to make

impressions on others in difficult circumstances.
While the target person read the instructions, the

experimenter prepared four envelopes, labeled
4,

1

through

each of which contained instructions for one of the

issues.

Each instruction form indicated the target's own

position, the "partner's" alleged position, and the

position that the target should convey on the videotape.
The "partner's" position was manipulated to be the same
as the target's position on half the statements, and

opposite to the target's position on the other half.
Additionally, each target was asked to convey his or her
true position on two of the issues, and a false position
on the other two issues.

Consequently, each target

conveyed two honest messages and two dishonest messages.
The order of the issues, and the order of the type of

message (honest/dishonest), was randomly assigned to each
target person.

16

When the experimenter returned, each
target person
was told that during the session,
he or she would have to
open one envelope, read the instructions,
think about
what to say, and present a position on each
of the

attitude statements.

This procedure was followed until

all the envelopes were opened and all four
attitude

statements were addressed.

After each target person was

finished with all four attitude messages, he or she was
debriefed, and consent was obtained to use the videotapes
for future research.

Procedure
Judges were given the written instructions that

contained the suspicion manipulation, where judges in the
high suspicion condition were told that target persons
are "usually" untruthful, while participants in the low

suspicion condition were told that the target persons are
"sometimes" untruthful.

The instructions explained that

the study concerns people's ability to make impressions

on others, and indicated the issues that the target

persons discuss in the video.
the instructions,

After all the judges read

the experimenter asked if there were

any questions, and then began the videotape.
fragment,

After each

judges were given 10 seconds to answer the

following questions:

(1)

To what extent do you think this

person was truthful?

(2)

To what extent do you believe

17

.

.

these arguments represent what the
person actually

believes?

(3)

Was this person basically honest or

dishonest in his or her statement?

Questions

(1)

and

(2)

were followed by a 9-point scale anchored at
very

untruthful
all

-

-

very truthful for question

completely for question

(2)

and not at

(1)

Question

(3)

was

followed by the words Honest and Dishonest, and the
judges were asked to mark one of the two.

All three

questions were designed to measure how honest or
dishonest the person on the tape seemed to the judge (see

Appendix

A)

Following the viewing and judgments on all 33
fragments,

the experimenter administered the nonverbal

cue belief questionnaire (see Appendix

B)

to the judges.

This 18-item questionnaire was constructed using the

results of a meta-analysis of the cues associated with

deception (DePaulo, et al

.

,

1985).

Each item asked how

likely is it for someone not telling the truth to perform
a specific nonverbal behavior,

contact, and the

9

for example,

increased eye

-point scale was anchored at very

unlikely and very likely.

After the judges completed the

belief questionnaire, they were debriefed and excused.
Belief Questionnaire
Before any analyses were performed, the ratings made

by each judge on the 18 -item belief questionnaire were
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added to arrive at each judge's belief
accuracy score
(Mean score = 96.25, SD = 10.85), where
higher scores

suggest more accurate beliefs about what
behaviors are

associated with deception.

A median split on the belief

accuracy scores resulted in 34 judges being assigned
to
the low (inaccurate) end of the scale, and
34 judges

being assigned to the high (accurate) end of the scale.
Results

Manipulation Check
Judges were asked on a

had attended to the video.

9

-point scale how much they

As expected,

judges assigned

to the high suspicion paid more attention to the clips
=

compared to judges in the low suspicion condition

7.25)

(M =

(M

6.33),

F 1
(

=

40)

,

4.03, p

<

Furthermore,

.05.

neither judges' belief accuracy, F

(1,

40)

=

.01,

p

=

n.s., nor the interaction between suspicion and belief

accuracy, F

(1,

40)

=

affected judges'

1.80, p = n.s.,

responses on the manipulation check.

Detecting Deception
A

2

(suspicion: high vs. low) x

high vs. low) x

2

(target sex) x

2

2

(belief accuracy:

(type of message:

honest vs. dishonest) MANOVA using all

3

dependent

variables measuring how honest the target person seemed
was performed.

Two dependent variables were measured on

a continuous 9-point Likert scale,
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while the third

dependent variable was a forced-choice
question, which
asked participants whether they
thought the targets were
honest or dishonest.
a score of

A response of "Honest" was coded as

and a response of "Dishonest" was scored
as

1

Therefore, the mean scores on this dependent
variable

0.

represents the proportion of targets judged to be
honest.
Furthermore, the first two factors were between subjects,

while the latter two were within subjects.
The results of the multivariate analyses revealed a

significant effect for the type of message main effect,
where,

in general, people were able to distinguish

between honest and dishonest messages, F(3,
2

.001

<

P

(r)

=

=

62)

19.86,

This effect was significant in all

.49).

three univariate analyses.

Judges rated the target

persons who were honest significantly more truthful
than target persons who were dishonest

5.91)
F 1
(

,

64)

17.91, p

=

<

2

.001

(r|

=

.22)

.

(M =

5.52,),

(M =

Similarly, judges

thought that honest targets actually believed in their

arguments more
5.21),

F 1
(

,

64)

=

than dishonest targets

5.78)

(M =

52.46 p

<

.001

2

(T|

=

.45).

Judges also

correctly identified targets that were honest
from targets that were dishonest
35.92, p

<

.001

2

(T|

=

.36)

(M =

.56),

(M =

(M =

F(l,

.66)

64)

=

.

The MANOVA on the theoretically meaningful

interaction of suspicion, belief accuracy, and type of
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.

.

message was marginally significant,
F(3,
•

15

2

(T|

=

.

36)

.

62)

2.02, p

<

Although the multivariate analysis was

not significant, all three univariate
analyses were

significant and in the predicted direction.
Table 1. The effects of suspicion, belief accuracy
and
type of message on ratings of (a) truthfulness,
(b)
belief in arguments, and (c) honesty/dishonesty.

Dependent
Measure

Suspicion

Belief
Accuracy

Type of
message

Mean

Truthfulness

Low

Low

Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest

6

.

5

.

High

High

Low

High

Believes in
the arguments

Low

Low

High

High

Low

High

Honest or
Dishonest

Low

Low

High

High

Low

High

071
790

a

5.602
5.466

a

.691

a

5.496

a

107
5.484
5 871

b

5.415
5.431

a

046
.595

a

5.221

a

127
.235
.670
575
631
569
.618
549
.728
528

D

5

6

a

a

.

a
a

.

5

5

6
5

a

.

a

.

a
a
a

.

a

.

a

.

a

a

.

D
a

.

Statistically significant (p < .01) mean
Note
differences in the post-hoc Tukey WSD analyses
represented by different superscripts. Post-hoc analyses
were conducted within honest and dishonest types of
messages
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The univariate analyses showed a
significant difference
in the truthful -untruthful
question,
•

05

2

(r|

=

.06),

a

F(l,

64)

=

3.86,

p

<

significant difference in the question

concerning whether targets actually believed
in their
arguments, F(l, 64)

=

4.09, p

<

2

.05

(r|

=

.06).

Finally,

the three-way interaction on the third dependent
variable

was significant, F(l,64)

=

5.37,

p

<

.05

2

(r|

=

.08)

All

.

three of these analyses showed that people who were

suspicious and had accurate beliefs were significantly

better at detecting deception than any other experimental
group
Sex Differences
The multivariate analyses yielded a significant

target sex x type of message interactions, F(3, 62)
7.06, p

<

2

.001

(r|

=

.26)

.

Univariate analyses with each

of the dependent variables were significant.

rated "honest" women as more truthful
"dishonest" women

(M =

=

(M =

Judges

6.00)

than

5.4), while there was little

difference in judges' ratings of men who were honest
5.73)
.001

and dishonest
2

(r|

=

.22)

.

(M =

5.71),

F(l,

64)

=

17.70, p

(M =
<

When judges were asked whether they

thought the targets actually believed in the arguments

they were presenting, the same pattern emerged, F(l,
=

19.49, p

<

.001

2

(T|

=

64)

Judges thought that women

.23).
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who were being honest actually believed
in their

arguments
(M -

(M =

5.07)

5.92)

compared to women who were dishonest

while judges' ratings for men were very

similar regardless of whether they were being
honest
or dishonest

5.59)

(M =

5.39).

Judges also correctly

identified honest female targets

women

(M =

.53),

(M =

.70)

from dishonest

but judges did not significantly

differentiate between honest
.58)

(M =

(M =

and dishonest

.62)

(M =

male targets in the forced-choice dependent

variable, F(l, 64)

=

16.30, p

<

2

.001

(r|

=

These

.20).

findings show that lies told by women were detected more

easily than lies told by men.
Finally,

a

4-way interaction between target sex,

suspicion, belief group, and type of message was observed
in the forced-choice question,
2

(r|

=

.16)

.

F(3,

62)

=

3.84, p

<

.05

Although the multivariate analysis was

significant, the only ANOVA that revealed a significant

difference was the analysis consisting of the forcedchoice question, F(l, 64)

=

3.74, p

<

.05

2

(r|

=

.06).

This interaction revealed that the theoretically

significant 3-way interaction between suspicion, belief
group,

and type of message was qualified by the sex of

the target

For male targets, the pattern of results mirrored
the

3

-way interaction.

Judges in the low suspicion

23

condition could not differentiate
between honest and
dishonest male targets, while judges
were significantly
more accurate at detecting male targets
when they were

highly suspicious and had accurate beliefs.
targets,

For female

there was little difference between judges
in

the four groups

(high suspicion-high belief accuracy;

high suspicion-low belief accuracy; low suspicion-high
belief accuracy; low suspicion- low belief accuracy)
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Figure 1. Proportion of targets rated as honest as a
function of belief accuracy, suspicion, type of message,
and sex of the target person. Different superscripts
represent statistically significant differences in the
post-hoc Tukey test (p < .01).
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Discussion
This study found that people are
able to

distinguish, to some degree, dishonest
messages from

honest messages.

The analysis of the effects of

suspicion and belief accuracy suggests that the
most
accurate judges of deception are those people who
have

accurate beliefs, but this only occurs when those beliefs
are activated.

Finally, a gender difference was found,

where lies told by target women were more easily detected
than lies told by target men.
The results of this study provide initial evidence

regarding the role that activated beliefs have on the

accuracy of detecting deception.

It was hypothesized

that a person's beliefs about what behaviors are

associated with deception would influence the accuracy of
that person's assessment of deception only if those

beliefs were activated.

In other words,

the best lie

detectors are not only those people who have accurate

beliefs about what behaviors they should attend to, but
they should also be able to use those beliefs when it is
appropriate.

In this study,

the most accurate judges in

detecting deception were those who had accurate beliefs
and were suspicious, especially when they were judging

male targets.
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The results of this study shed new light on a

problem encountered in deception detection research.
Various attempts have been made to teach judges to become

better lie detectors (Zuckerman, Koestner, & Alton,
1984)

.

Usually this involves showing a videotaped

interview of a person being honest and dishonest and

pointing out behaviors indicative of deception, or simply
identifying in which fragment the person was honest or
dishonest.

Afterwards, judges are shown a video with

many target persons who are either honest or dishonest,
and included with these target persons is the target

person used in instructing the judges.

The findings of

these studies show that training procedures, in general,

show an increase in accuracy in the part of the judges,
but most of this increase is due to the judges being

exceptionally accurate when they rate the target person
used in their instruction.
The results of the present study suggest that

trained participants have accurate beliefs, but those
beliefs were not sufficiently activated with all target
persons.

However, when the instructional target person

appears on tape, the judges become extremely suspicious
disposal
and use the accurate beliefs they have at their
the target
to make accurate distinctions between when

dishonest.
person was honest and when he or she was

27
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Another effect found in this study was the gender by
type of message interaction, where lies told by women

were more easily detected than lies told by men.
and colleagues suggest that women may have

DePaulo

higher

a

motivation to make a good impression than men, which may
make them more susceptible to displaying certain

nonverbal behaviors that judges might use to detect

deception (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985)

.

Although the results of this study suggest that
accurate beliefs do, in some cases, lead to better
accuracy,
First,

it is important to point out some limitations.

the belief scale was constructed from previous

research and may not reflect the accuracy of beliefs
concerning behaviors associated with deception in the
specific population of target persons being studied.

Given that the scale was a useful way to distinguish

between people who had accurate and inaccurate beliefs,

a

more context - specif ic scale may make the effect found

stronger
Second,

it should be kept in mind that the type of

deception being investigated is of a very specific kind,
deception about a person's attitude.

It is possible that

people lie in different ways depending on the domain, and
that when people lie about attitudes, they display
about
different nonverbal behaviors than when they lie
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feelings.

Study III and IV will investigate other types

of deception

(Study III — what targets have in their

possession; Study IV
In conclusion,

—

events in the targets' lives)

this study provides initial evidence

for the hypothesis that accurate beliefs about what

behaviors indicate deception are an important determinant
in a person's accuracy in detecting deception, but only

when those beliefs are activated.

Presumably, suspicion

activated the beliefs that people had about what are the
appropriate cues associated with deception, and
therefore, more accurate beliefs led to more accurate

detection of deception.
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CHAPTER III

STUDY II: A DECEPTION DETECTION BELIEF SCALE

Overview
The results of Study

I

suggest that a belief

accuracy scale may be able to distinguish between people
who are good and bad detectors of deception.

On the

basis of these findings, it seemed reasonable to

investigate further the properties of the scale.
Because each item of the scale is designed to

measure belief accuracy concerning a specific behavior
and the overall score reflects an overall accuracy score,
it was expected that the items would not necessarily be

highly correlated with each other.

For example, an

accurate belief about whether people blink their eyes

more when deceiving is not necessarily related or

affected by an accurate or inaccurate belief concerning
deceivers' extent of smiling.
The analysis of these data also investigated whether

men have different beliefs than women and whether men and
women's belief accuracy differs.

A factor analysis was

variables
also performed in order to identify underlying

within the scale.
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Method

Participants and Procedure
Eight -hundred and ninety-one undergraduate

psychology students completed
groups of

5

a

to 100 participants.

battery of tests in
Included in this

battery was the dichotomous (yes or no) version of the
Nonverbal Cues Belief Scale used in Study

I

as part of a

start of the semester screening procedure (see Appendix
B)

.

This scale contained 18 "yes" or "no" questions

about behaviors that people may or may not perform when

attempting to deceive someone else.

participants

(25 percent)

Data from 222

were discarded because they

failed to complete all items on the scale.

A total of

669 participants were used for the analyses.

Accuracy was again determined using the results from
previous meta-analyses (DePaulo et al
person'

s

1985).

;

A

accuracy score was calculated as the average

score of each item on the scale, where

answer and

0

was an incorrect answer.

1

was a correct

Mean accuracy

scores closer to

1

suggest high belief accuracy, while

scores closer to

0

suggest low belief accuracy.

scores of

.5

Mean

represent a belief accuracy rate at chance

level
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Results

Descriptive Statistics
Overall accuracy was distributed normally with a

mean of .54 and a standard deviation of .11.

Mean

accuracy for each of the 18 items ranged from
Item

4

(talking slowly)

irrelevant information)

to .82 for Item 10
.

for

.23

(giving

This suggests that people

generally have accurate beliefs about some behaviors that
people perform when attempting to deceive, but that there
are other behaviors about which people generally have

inaccurate beliefs.
Scale Characteristics

Mean belief accuracy

(M =

.54)

was significantly

more accurate than chance level (.50),
<.001.

t

(668)

9.73, p

=

Although significantly different from chance, the

mean difference is quite small (mean difference

=

.04)

Further analysis using Chi-square tests of the individual
items reveal that participants were more accurate on some
items compared to others.

Specifically, people were most accurate in items

relating to eye contact,

"ahs" and "urns" utterings,

irrelevant information, general responses, and people
uses of "adaptors".

People,

in general,

were very

inaccurate in items concerning deceivers' slow speech,

speech errors, and posture.

Interestingly, the mean
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scores for the only two items relating to facial

expressions (smiles and facial expressions) were at
chance levels.

Table 2: Description of beliefs, mean accuracy of
beliefs, and results of Chi-Square analyses (* p <.05;
** p <

.

01)

Item Number

Description

Mean

1

Eye contact

2

Speech hesitation
Smiling
Talk slowly
Speech errors
Facial expression
Head movement
Posture
Negative statements
Irrelevant info.
General responses
Self -ref erences
Discrepancy
Pitch of voice
Blinking
Shrug
"Adaptors"
Leg movement

.79
80
.51
.24
.28
.41
.40
.27
.43
82
.73
.59
.79
.39
55
.46
.79
.39

Chi-Square
(1)

3

4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

218.6 **
249.3 **

.

.

538

619.0 **
124.5 **
.

07

27.2
142.3
12.2
266.6
144.1
22.5
227.8
34.0
6.7
3.6
223.2
31.8

.

.

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

An alpha reliability for the entire scale was also

calculated and found to be quite low
n.s.)

.

((X

=

-.01, p =

This unusually low reliability is not surprising

because the 18 scale items were not expected to be highly

correlated with each other.

Each item measures a

person's belief accuracy for a specific behavior, and a
on
belief on one behavior did not predict the belief

another behavior, producing the low alpha reliability.
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A principal components factor analysis with
quartimax rotation was performed on the 18 scale items.
From this analysis, three factors emerged.

consisted of items

1,

3,

6,

7,

and 18.

16,

8,

Factor

1

Because

all these items relate to nonverbal behaviors,

this

factor was named "Nonverbal Belief Accuracy"

Factor

consisted of items

2,

4,

5,

9,

10,

11,

.

and 13, as they

are all verbal/ paralinguist ic behaviors,

this factor was

named "Verbal/Paralinguistic Belief Accuracy"
factor

3

consisted of items 12

(pitch increase)

,

15

,

and 17

Finally,

.

(self -ref erence)

(eye blinking)

2

,

14

(adaptors)

There is no distinct pattern to this factor, leading it
to be called the "Miscellaneous" factor.

The three

factors jointly account for 40% of the variance.

Table 3: Three distinct factors with mean belief
accuracy, standard deviation, and t values of one-sample
(** p < .01).
t-test with .5 set as chance level.

Factor
Nonverbal
Behavior Cues
Verbal /
Paralinguistic
Cues
Miscellaneous
Cues

Mean

Eigenvalue
2.45

.47

2 .31

2

.

.

58

.58

19

SD

(668)

t

.25

-2.68 **

17

12.25 **

.27

7.62 **

.

than chance
In general, people's accuracy was better

measured
in the beliefs about behaviors of deceivers
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the Verbal /Paralingui stic and Miscellaneous factors.

These differences were significantly different from
chance on both factors,
(Verbal/Paralinguistic)
(Miscellaneous)

t

,

(668)

and

t

=

12.25, £

(668)

=

<

.001

7.62, p

.001

<

On the other hand, people's accuracy in

.

the Nonverbal Behavior factor was below chance level,
=

(668)

-2.68, p

t

.01.

<

Group Differences in Accuracy

One-way ANOVA's were conducted to test whether the
belief accuracy of men and women differed.
analyses,

In these

589 participants were included because there

was no data on the sex of eighty participants.

There was

no overall belief accuracy difference between men
.53)

and women

(M =

.53),

F

(1,

587)

=

.31,

(M =

p = n.s.

Although there was no significant difference in the
overall accuracy, men had more accurate beliefs than

women in the Nonverbal Behavior factor
.43,

respectively),

F

(1,

587)

=

(M =

6.12, p

<

.49 and M =

Men's

.05.

average belief accuracy was at chance level, while

women's belief accuracy was below chance level.

Men and

women also differed in the Miscellaneous factor, where
women
.51),

(M =

F

.59)

(1,

had more accurate beliefs than men

587)

=

12.59, p

<
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(M =
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Discussion
Overall, people seemed to have somewhat accurate

beliefs about the behaviors that predict deception,
albeit the magnitude of the measured accuracy was quite
low.

Alpha reliability of the scale was very low, but

this result was to be expected because each item measures

accuracy for a specific behavior, and a belief about one
deceptive behavior might not affect a person's belief
about another behavior.

A factor analysis revealed three distinct factors,
the first two of which correspond to distinct categories:

Nonverbal cues and Verbal/Paralinguistic cues.

People

were most accurate with regards to Verbal/Paralinguistic
cues and their accuracy on Nonverbal cues was below

chance level.

Men were more accurate in their beliefs

about Nonverbal cues, but both men and women were at or

below chance level.

Furthermore, women were more

accurate in the Miscellaneous factor and men and women'
belief accuracy did not differ in the

Verbal/Paralinguistic factor.
In conclusion,

the scale attributes suggest that

people's beliefs about the cues that predict deception
are not very accurate, especially when concerned with

beliefs about the nonverbal cues that predict deception.
The results of these analyses give us a greater

36

understanding of the attributes of the scale being used.
In the following studies,

sub-scales consisting of the

Nonverbal Behavior and Verbal/Paralinguistic Factors may
help in understanding the processes involved in detecting

deception and what types of cues people attend to when
attempting to detect deception.
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CHAPTER IV

STUDY III: DETECTING DECEPTION ON AIRLINE PASSENGERS

Overview
The results of Study

I

suggest that judges who have

accurate beliefs about the cues that predict deception
are better at detecting deception, but only when they are

highly suspicious of the target persons.
persons used for Study

I

undergraduate students.

The target

were first and second year
In order to generalize the

findings, target persons for Study III included a more

representative sample of the general population, as well
as a more ecologically valid situation.

Participants acting as judges viewed videotaped
fragments of actual airline passengers attempting to

carry contraband past an experimenter and were asked to

identify those passengers who they believed were carrying
contraband.
instructions.

As in Study

I,

In addition,

suspicion was manipulated via
judges were given the

Nonverbal Cue Belief Scale used in Study II in order to

measure their accuracy in the beliefs about the
behavioral cues that predict deception.

This belief

questionnaire consisted of the 18 items previously used
in the forced-choice scale in Study II
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(see Appendix B)

.

The basic design of the study is a

high vs. low) x

2

(suspicion:

2

(belief accuracy: high vs.

low)

x

2

(contraband: yes vs. no), with the last factor within

subjects.

The dependent variables were the judges'

ratings on the truthfulness questions for each fragment.

Method

Participants
Twenty-eight passengers

(14

females and 16 males)

waiting for flights at a large international United
States airport were asked to volunteer to participate
(see Appendix C for letter of cooperation)

.

The

passengers who volunteered were told that they would
receive up to $30 for their participation in a Customs

Agency training video.
with 14 Anglo-Americans,
African-Americans,

1

The sample was ethnically diverse
8

Latinos,

Portuguese and

3

French-Canadians

1

Israeli.

,

3

Undergraduate college student participants (judges)

watched and judged the video samples of the airline
passengers
Passenger Recording Procedure
Individual mock customs interviews were held, with

volunteer passengers being told that videos were being
made to test and train customs agents.

One experimenter

acted as the customs agent performing the interview,
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which took place next to an airline gate, and
a second

experimenter prepared the passengers for the interview.
Passengers were randomly chosen to be in the

contraband condition, where they attempted to pass a
briefcase with contraband, or in the no contraband
condition, where they attempted to pass a briefcase

without contraband.

To increase motivation to remain

undetected, all passengers were given $30 at the

beginning of the session.

However, they were told that

they would loose $15 if their briefcase was searched by
the second experimenter.

When people attempt to carry

contraband into the country, they stand to loose the

contraband item and money in fines.

Therefore, by giving

the passengers the money at the beginning of the session

and threatening to take away part of it if they were
searched, passengers' motivation would more closely match
the actual scenario people encounter when going through a

customs checkpoint.

search any passenger.

In reality,

there was no attempt to

Consequently, every volunteer

received $30 compensation.
All passengers, regardless of the condition they

were assigned, were given an empty briefcase and various
travel items such as a book, sweater, airline tickets, a

daily planner and a gift-box.

Experimenter

1

named and

handed each item to the passenger in order for the

40

.

passenger to place the item inside the briefcase.

The

gift-box was always the last item handed to the
passenger.

For passengers chosen to pass contraband, the

experimenter opened the gift-box to reveal six cigars.
Passengers were told that these were illegal Cuban cigars
that they would attempt to pass through Customs.

After the passengers placed all the items in the
briefcase, the experimenter instructed them to answer

truthfully any question that the customs agent
(experimenter

2)

asked, except when it referred to the

contraband item, in which case they should deny having
that item in their possession and that there were

chocolates inside the gift-box.
was to avoid experimenter

2

Their goal, therefore,

from opening the gift-box

hiding the cigars.
For passengers assigned to not pass contraband,

experimenter
item,

1

also named and handed the passengers each

including a gift-box, which the experimenter opened

to reveal the chocolates that were inside.

The

experimenter instructed these passengers to answer

truthfully any question asked by the customs agent
(experimenter

2)

Each interview lasted between

3

to

5

minutes and

included various questions regarding the passengers'
travel and whether they were carrying any contraband.
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Specifically, experimenter

2

asked each passenger what

was inside the bag, asked them to open the bag, and
asked

what was inside the gift-box.

These questions were

designed to closely mirror the actual questions asked by
customs agents at airports, and to force passengers in
the contraband condition to tell lies of omission

(filing to mention that they had cigars in the
briefcase) and lies of commission (telling the

experimenter that there were chocolates in the gift-box
when there were actually cigars)

.

After each passenger

answered the questions, he or she was thanked and

debriefed
Portions of all interviews were edited onto a master
videotape, which consisted of 1-minute fragments of each
interview.

All fragments were of the final minute of

conversation with experimenter

2,

where the experimenter

asked what was in the briefcase, asked the passenger to
open the briefcase, and asked what was in the gift-box.
Half the fragments were of passengers asked to pass

contraband

(8

male and

7

female passengers)

,

and the

other half of the passengers not asked to pass

contraband

(8

male and

7

female passengers)

.

One of the

passengers did not follow instructions, and therefore his

video was not used.
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Interview Viewing Procedure
In Part II of the study, groups of 2-10

undergraduate students viewed the tape created from the

passenger interviews

They were given written

.

instructions in which they were told to watch a video and

answer a variety of questions regarding whether the

person on the video fragment was being deceitful, and
whether the person should be searched for contraband.
Furthermore, a suspicion manipulation, similar to that

used in Study

I

was introduced in the written

instructions
Similar to Study

I,

the suspicion manipulation was a

manipulation of the expected number of passengers that
were engaging in deception.

The instructions for the

high-suspicion condition stated that many of the people
on the tape were carrying contraband.

In the low-

suspicion condition, the instructions stated that only
some of the people on the tape were carrying contraband.

After all the judges read the instructions, the

experimenter began the videotape of the passengers
recorded in Part

I.

After viewing each fragment, judges

answered questions designed to measure how honest or
dishonest the passenger on the tape seemed to them (see

Appendix

A)

.

After viewing all fragments, judges were

debriefed and excused.
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Results

Manipulation Check
At the end of the session, all judges were asked

what percent of the passengers did they think where

attempting to carry contraband.

As expected, judges

assigned to the high suspicion condition thought that a
percent of the passengers were attempting to carry

contraband

(M =

40.7%)

suspicion condition

(M =

24.5%), F(l,

7.26, p

=

74)

<

Furthermore, neither judges' belief accuracy, F

.01.
74)

compared to judges in the low

=

(1,

p = n.s., nor the interaction between

.55,

suspicion and belief accuracy, F

=

74)

(1,

1.16, p =

affected judges' responses on the manipulation

n.s.,

check

Detecting Passenger Deception

A

2

(suspicion: high vs. low) x

high vs. low) x
no)

(target sex) x

2

2

(belief accuracy:

(contraband: yes vs.

multivariate analysis of variance was performed on
The two continuous variables were measured on

the data.

a 9-point scale.

As in previous studies, judges were,

general, able to detect deception, F
.001

2

2

(T|

=

.34).

(M =

persons not carrying contraband
<

.001

73)

=

12.37, p

Judges rated targets carrying

contraband as less truthful

36.92, p

(3,

2

(T)

=

.33).

5.0)
(M =

than those target
5.3),

F

(1,

75)

=

Judges also were accurate
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in
<

.

when asked which targets they thought were carrying

contraband
M
p

=
<

(M = 2.93

in the no-contraband condition,

3.23 in the contraband condition), F
.001

(r)

=

.28)

(1,

75

=

)

and

29.02,

Judges were also accurate in

.

distinguishing between people carrying contraband and
those who were not carrying contraband when asked to

indicate whether they would stop the passenger in order
to search for contraband,
=

.18)

.

F

(1,

=

75)

16.27, p

<

.001

(if

Judges indicated that they would search more of

the passengers in the contraband condition

passengers in the no-contraband condition

(M =

(M =

than

.38)
.30)

.

To test the hypothesis that people with accurate

beliefs are better at detecting deception, especially

when they are highly suspicious, a

3

-way interaction

between suspicion level, belief accuracy, and type of
This test revealed no significant

message was tested.

difference between the groups, F

(3,

73)

=

1.62, p

=

n.s.

This hypothesis was also tested with a multivariate

analysis using the

2

major scale components identified in

the factor analysis of Study II, but neither of the 3-way

interactions between the verbal component of the scale,

suspicion and type of message, or between the nonverbal
component, suspicion and type of message were

significant
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,

.

On the other hand, there was a marginally

significant multivariate difference in the 2-way

interaction between suspicion and type of message, F
73)

=

2.i2, p

<

2

.1

(r|

=

.08)

When suspicious, judges

.

rated honest targets as more truthful

dishonest targets

(3,

(M =

than

5.13)

but judges who were not

(M = 4.68)

suspicious were not able to distinguish between honest
=

and dishonest targets

5.46)

4.82, p

<

.05

2

(r)

=

.06)

.

(M =

5.26),

(M =

not suspicious

3.57)

=

75)

(1,

Suspicious judges were also

able to distinguish between honest

dishonest

F

(M

(M =

and

3.16)

targets compared to judges who were

(Honest M = 2.74; Dishonest M

=

2.95)

by

identifying who was more likely to be carrying
contraband, F

75)

(1,

=

3.09, p

<

.1

they would search for contraband, F
.05

2

(ij

=

.06).

2

(ij

(1,

=

.04),

75)

and who

= 4.91,

p

<

Suspicious judges said that they would

be more likely to search dishonest targets for contraband
(M =

.42)

compared to honest targets

(M =

Judges

.32)

who were not suspicious were not able to correctly decide

whom they would search for contraband (honest M
dishonest M

=

=

.29 and

.32)

Perceptions of Deceptiveness
Besides effects relating to accuracy, judges

perceived certain targets as more deceptive than others
did.

was
One interesting, although not unexpected result
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a

multivariate main effect for suspicion, F

2.52, p

.06

<

2

=

(r|

.09).

73

(3,

Specifically, highly

suspicious judges rated targets as less truthful
than judges in the low suspicion condition

4.9)
5.4)

F

,

(1,

75)

7.10, p

=

=

)

2

.01

<

(

=

r|

.09)

(M =
(M =

In addition,

.

suspicious judges rated targets as more likely to be

carrying contraband

(M =

3.4)

suspicion condition

(M =

2.8),

2

(T|

=

.

09)

than judges in the low
F

(1,

75)

7.37,

=

p

.01

<

.

Furthermore, a MANOVA revealed that men were seen as
less truthful, more likely to carry contraband and to be

searched than women, F

=

73)

(3,

20.29, p

Judges rated men as less truthful

.46)

women

(M =

5.3),

F

(1,

28.00, p

=

75)

<

2

.001

<

(M =

.001

(r|

5.0)
(if

=

=

than
.27).

Judges also found men more likely to be carrying

contraband

(M =

52.92, p

.001

<

3.3)
2

(r)

=

than women

(M =

2.9),

F

.36)

(M =

.28),

F

75)

=

Finally, judges indicated

.41).

that they would be more likely to search men

than women

(1,

(1,

75)

=

41.84, p

<

(M =

.40)

.001

(T|

.

This difference between male and female targets was

especially apparent for judges who were not suspicious,
(3,

73)

=

2.93, p

<

.05

2

(T)

=

.11).

Judges in the low

suspicion condition rated males as less truthful
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(M -

F

than females

5.1)

(M =

while judges in the high

5.6),

suspicion condition did not significantly differentiate

between male
(1,

75)

=

(M = 4.8)

8.79, p

<

.01

and female (M
2

(T|

=

=

4.9)

targets,

F

The same pattern

.11).

emerged when judges were asked the likelihood that the
target was carrying contraband, F
2

(T|

=

.07)

.

(1,

75)

(M =

5.57, £

<

3.2)

targets.

(M =

3.5)

and

On the other hand, judges in

the low suspicion condition rated male targets as more

likely to be carrying contraband
targets

(M =

.05

Highly suspi cious judges assigned the same

likelihood of carrying contraband to male
female

=

2.5).

48

(M =

3.1)

than female

.

Discussion

Although the test of the hypotheses did not show the
expected pattern, this study provides interesting data

concerning people's accuracy in detecting deception and
people

s

settings.

perception of deceptiveness in law enforcement
The target persons used in this study were not

undergraduate students and the sample was ethnically
diverse
This study found that judges were, in general, able
to distinguish between people who were attempting to

deceive and people who were not attempting to deceive.
This is an important result because most of the studies
that investigate people's accuracy in detecting deception

have dealt with student samples as the target persons.
The study shows evidence that people, in general, can

detect deception at a better than chance level on nonstudent samples.
The study also found that judges who were suspicious

were better able to detect deception compared to judges

who were not suspicious.

This is an intriguing finding

given that previous research has not found a relationship

between suspicion level and deception detection accuracy
(e.g.,

Toris & DePaulo, 1985).

One difference between

previous studies investigating suspicion and this study
Previous studies have used

are the target persons used.
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student samples, which are younger and less ethnically

diverse than the sample used in this study.

In addition,

the procedure used to video-record the deception has not

been used in studies investigating the effects of

suspicion on deception.

This procedure differs from lab

procedures because it was performed at an airport and

participants were led to believe that the purpose of the
session was to make training videos for real customs
agents
The difference in procedure might have led target

persons to act in different ways when deceiving than
those suggested by previous meta-analyses.

Moreover, a

diverse sample such as this sample might perform

different behaviors when deceiving than homogeneous
student samples represented in the meta-analysis (DePaulo
et al

.

,

1985)

.

If this were true,

then the scale used in

this study would not be a good predictor of a person's

belief accuracy because the behaviors actually indicative
of deception for this sample would be unknown.

Furthermore, the factors mentioned above may have

also been related to the effect of suspicion on accuracy.
The hypothesis of this study is that when a person is
suspicious, the person will attend to the behaviors or
cues that he or she believes will predict deception.
in general,

If,

judges' beliefs about the cues that predict
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deception were accurate for this specific sample,
then
suspicious judges would attend to the correct behaviors,
and make accurate assessments about the deceptiveness
of

each target.
It is important to keep in mind that the belief

scale used in this study was a forced-choice

questionnaire.

In Study

I,

the scale was continuous.

A

continuous scale may have been a more precise way of

measuring the strength of the beliefs, where stronger
beliefs have a stronger impact on the overall accuracy
score
This study also showed that judges viewed men as
less truthful than women.

Interestingly, suspicious

judges did not rate men or women as more or less
truthful, but unsuspicious judges did rate men as less

truthful than women.

This might be due to judges who

were not suspicious relying on automatic stereotyping

processes
In conclusion,

Study III did not find direct

evidence for the hypothesis that people with accurate
belief about the behaviors that predict deception are

better at detecting deception when those beliefs are
activated.

Indirect evidence, such as the effect of

suspicion on accuracy, gives some support to the idea of
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beliefs driving accuracy.

Study IV was designed to shed

light on the discrepancies between Study

I

and Study III.

CHAPTER V

STUDY IV: DETECTING DECEPTION IN A MOCK JURY TRIAL

Overview

Study IV was designed to test the generalizability
of the effect that suspicion has on accuracy.

The idea

behind increased accuracy in detecting deception when

a

person is suspicious is that suspicion activates the
beliefs people have about the cues that predict
deception.

A motivation manipulation instead of a

suspicion manipulation was used in this study in order to
activate beliefs, and there was also an attempt to

manipulate people's beliefs concerning the behaviors that
people engage in when lying.

The drawback to the

previous studies was that belief accuracy was a
correlational variable.

This study attempted to

experimentally manipulate participants' beliefs.
Target persons were asked about an instance in which
they broke or did not break a law, and they were asked to

present their answers either honestly or dishonestly.
These answers were recorded and edited onto master tapes.
Participants then acted as jurors and viewed the
"depositions" of the target persons and answered a

variety of questions relating to how truthful their
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answers were.

Before viewing the video fragments,

participants were given written instructions that
described behaviors that people perform while being
deceptive.

The behaviors mentioned were either correct

or incorrect.

In addition,

the written instructions

contained an involvement manipulation.

This manipulation

was intended to make the behaviors that were mentioned in
the instructions

(correct or incorrect) more salient for

the participant.
It was hypothesized that participants who were

presented the correct behaviors would be better at
detecting deception than participants given the incorrect
behaviors, but only when they were highly involved.

Method

Participants
Twelve undergraduate students

(6

were recruited as the target persons.

females,

6

males)

For their

participation, the target persons received experimental
credit for their introductory psychology class.
Furthermore, undergraduate student participants acted as
the jurors in the case, and received experimental credit

for their participation.

Participants acting as judges

were recruited from the sample of students used in Study
II
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Encoding Procedure
Target persons entered an experimental room and were
told that they would have to remember and talk about past

experiences and then answer questions about the behaviors
as they happened and as if the behaviors had not taken

place.

Participants were first given a questionnaire,

which asked if they had been involved in a variety of
behaviors from traffic violations to drug use.

Once the

participant completed the questionnaire, the experimenter
read the participant's responses and verified that the

participant had engaged in underage drinking and used
illicit drugs at least once.

These would be the two

events that would be recorded, and would later be used as

stimulus material.
reasons:

(1)

These two events were chosen for two

a large percentage of college students

admitted to having engaged in both these behaviors at
least once, and

(2)

the two behaviors were,

in general,

at the opposite extremes in terms of how wrong the sample

viewed each of the behaviors.

Underage drinking was seen

as a more benign activity (M = 3.80 on a 10-point scale)

than illegal drug use

(M =

6.1)

.

By using both events

for the stimulus material, the perceived severity of the

behavior could be investigated as a factor affecting
deception detection accuracy.
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Two practice question and answer sessions
took
place, where in one exchange the experimenter
asked the

target person to remember one situation in which he
or
she broke a traffic law and one situation in which he
or
she had the opportunity to cheat on an exam but did not.

These two events were selected because, in pilot testing,
almost 100 percent of college students admitted to

committing traffic violations and having the opportunity
to cheat on a test but not doing so.

After the practice session, participants were asked
to remember the stimulus events, underage drinking and

drug use.

The experimenter instructed the target persons

to imagine that they were being questioned by a lawyer

about a specific event.

Half the participants answered

questions about a situation in which they used illegal
drugs, a situation in which they had the opportunity to

use illegal drugs but did not, a situation in which they

had an alcoholic drink while being underage, and a

situation in which they had the opportunity to have an
alcoholic drink while being underage but did not.

The

other half of the participants were asked questions in
the reverse order,

starting with the two underage

drinking events followed by the two drug use events.
For each of the two behaviors (drug use and underage

drinking)

,

participants were asked to write down a
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description of the events in question to help remind
themselves.

Participant wrote a description for the

situations in which

(1)

the participants engaged in drug

use/underage drinking, and

(2)

the event where the

participant had the opportunity to engage in drug

use/underage drinking but did not do so.

After writing

down a description of the event, the experimenter handed
the participant an envelope which instructed the

participant to answer the questions in one of four
different ways:

(1)

Describe the event in which you

consumed drugs/alcohol the way it happened;

(2)

Describe

the event in which you consumed drugs/alcohol as if it

had not happened;

(3)

Describe the event in which you had

the opportunity to consume drugs/alcohol but did not do
so,

the way it happened;

(4)

Describe the event in which

you had the opportunity to consume drugs/alcohol but did
not do so, as if they had actually consumed

drugs/alcohol.

This procedure meant that every

participant was truthful and lied about

a

situation in

which he or she consumed drugs and drank alcohol while
being underage, and a truth and a lie about a situation
in which he or she had the opportunity to consume drugs

or drink alcohol while underage, but did not do so.

After reading the instructions inside each envelope,
the experimenter would tell the participants "You have
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been accused of underage drinking/illegal drug
use.
Please tell me,

m

question."

in your own words, what happened the day

Participants would then describe the

situation as they were instructed in the envelope.
These recordings were then edited onto two tapes.
On both tapes, each target person appeared

telling the truth and twice telling a lie.

4

times,

twice

Two tapes

were made in order for targets not to appeared to be

talking about the same situation twice, therefore,
targets appear on each tape talking once about each of
the

4

situations:

(1)

when they engaged in drug use;

(2)

when they had the opportunity to engage in drug use but
did not do so;
(4)

(3)

when they drank while underage; and

when they had the opportunity to drink while
Therefore, each tape had

underage, but did not do so.
48 fragments.

Judging Procedure
Sixty-five participants acted as "jurors" who

watched one of the two videotapes and tried to tell which
of the witnesses were lying about the incident.

viewing the tape, participants were given

Before

a list of

behaviors that are exhibited by people when they are
telling lies (see Appendix

D)

.

This list consisted of

either correct behaviors (those behaviors that signal
deception) or incorrect behavior (those behaviors that do
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not signal deception) derived from previous
meta-analyses
of cues that predict deception
1985)

(e.g.

DePaulo et al

.

,

.

Written instructions manipulated the participant's
involvement, where some participants were told that the

experimenter was interested in people's accuracy in
detecting deception, and that it was important for them
to be as accurate as possible

condition)

.

(high involvement

Participants in the low involvement

condition were told that the experimenter was interested
in the process by which people decide whether a person is

being honest or dishonest, and that the experimenter was
interested in the way people attribute deception.

After

viewing each of the 48 video fragments, the participants
answered three questions concerning the truthfulness of
each of the target persons (see Appendix
The basic design of the study was a

high vs. low) x
2

(target sex) x

A)
2

(primed cues: correct vs.

2
2

(involvement:
incorrect) x

(type of message: honest vs.

dishonest), with the last factor within subjects.

Other

factors such as perceived severity of the behavior, and

whether the target person was talking about

a

situation

in which he or she engaged in a behavior or not were also

investigated.

The dependent variables were the
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participant's ratings on the truthfulness questions for
each fragment (Appendix

A)

Results

Manipulation Check
After viewing the tape, all participants were asked
a series of questions as manipulation checks.

Participants in the high and low involvement conditions
did not differ in the reported amount of effort, but did

differ in the percent of the target persons they thought
were being deceptive.

Participants assigned to the high

involvement condition thought that a higher percent of
the target persons were attempting to deceive

(M =

compared to judges in the low involvement condition
35.9%),

F 1
(

,

54)

=

5.39, p <

.05.

47.7%)
(M =

Furthermore, no other

factor affected the responses on the manipulation checks.

Deception Detection Accuracy
A multivariate analysis of variance main effect for
type of message revealed that,

in general, participants

were able to distinguish between targets being honest and
dishonest, F(3,58)

=

3.04, p

<

.05

2

(ij

=

.14).

Participants distinguished between honest and dishonest
targets when rating the likelihood of the target person

breaking the law (Honest M
F 1
(

,

60

)

=

5.22, p

<

.05

2

(T|

4.78; Dishonest M

=

=

.08).

=

4.91),

When asked whether

the
they thought the targets were being truthful about
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incident, participants thought that a greater
number of

honest targets were being honest

(M =

the dishonest targets

F(l,60)

^

~

(M =

.55),

.60)
=

compared to
10.68, p

<

.01

Although not significant, the same pattern

*15)

appeared when participants rated honest targets as more
truthful
F 1
(

=

6 0)

,

than dishonest targets

(M = 4.55)

2.05, p

.15

<

(if

=

(M =

4.47),

.03).

The test of the hypothesis between primed behaviors,

involvement, and type of message did not reveal a

significant multivariate 3-way interaction, F(3,58)
p = n.s.

.811,

(if

=

.04)

.

=

Furthermore, neither of the

three univariate analyses revealed any significant

differences
Interestingly, participants were better able to

distinguish between honest and dishonest targets
depending on the severity of the event they had engaged
in and whether the targets were being deceitful about a

situation in which they actually committed the infraction

compared to being deceitful about a situation in which
they had the opportunity to engage in the behavior but
did not do so.
The multivariate analysis revealed a significant 2-

way interaction between guilt and type of message,
F

(

3

,

58

)

=

100.94, p

<

.001

(if

=

.84).

The univariate

analyses revealed that participants rated honest targets
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as more truthful than dishonest targets
when the target

was actually guilty of the performing the behavior
(Honest M = 5.07; Dishonest M = 3.87)

compared to when

the target person was deceiving about a situation in

which he or she as actually not guilty (Honest M
Dishonest M
.69)

.

=

F(l,60)

5.09),

=

131.85, p

.001

<

4.03;

=
2

(r|

=

This difference also appeared when participants

indicated whether they thought the person was telling the
truth about the incident (Guilty: Honest M

Dishonest M

=

.40; Not Guilty:

Dishonest M

=

.72),F(1,60)

=

Honest M

149.21, p

=

<

.73 and

=

.46 and

.001

2

(T|

=

.71).

When rating the likelihood of the target person

breaking the law, the reverse pattern emerged where
participants distinguished between honest and dishonest
targets when the target was actually not guilty (Honest M
=

4.3; Dishonest M

guilty (Honest M
96.27, p

<

.001

compared to when the target was

5.2; Dishonest M = 4.4),

=
2

(T|

5.4)

=

=

.62).

F(l,60)

=

These effects are probably

due to people's bias in believing what was being said by
the target person.

This is especially evident in the

question concerning the likelihood that the person broke
the law, which has the reverse pattern of the other two

dependent variables.

When the target person was guilty

and honest, and when the target was not guilty and
dishonest, the target was describing an event where the
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target used drugs or drank while being underage,

therefore participants rated these fragments as high
in

likelihood of breaking the law.

On the other hand, when

the target was not guilty and honest, and guilty and

dishonest, the target persons were communicating that

they did not engage in drug use or underage drinking,

hence communicating a lower likelihood of committing a
transgression.

Therefore, a target's guilt did not

affect a participant's ability to detect deception;
rather,

the interaction reflects an inherent bias by the

participants to accept the story given by the target
persons as true.
On the other hand, the severity of the behavior had
an impact on the ability of the participants to detect

deception, F(3,58)

=

3.01,

p <

.05

2

(rj

=

.14).

The

severity factor reflects the perception of the sample
that drug use is a more severe and "wrong" behavior than

underage drinking, which is widely accepted in the
college sample.

more honest

Participants rated honest targets as

(M = 4.76)

than dishonest targets

in the low severity condition

(underage drinking)

the high severity condition (drug use)

p

<

.01

2

(T|

=

(M =

.13).

4.43)

.

(M =

target persons, F(l,60)

=

Participants were also able to
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In

participants were

not able to make a distinction between honest

and dishonest

(M = 4.51)

4.34)
8.99,

)

accurately identify the targets that were honest
from the
targets that were dishonest when the targets were
in the
low severity condition (Honest M
.56).

=

.64;

Dishonest M

=

In the high severity condition, participants were

not able to distinguish between honest and dishonest

targets (Honest M
6.22, p

<

.01

2

(T|

=
=

Dishonest M

.55;
10)

.

=

.56),

F(l,60)

=

.

Although not significant, the pattern of results was
the same for the question concerning the likelihood of
the targets breaking the law.

When in the low severity

condition honest targets were rated as less likely of

breaking the law

4.91; Dishonest M
01)

(M =

compared to the high severity condition (Honest M

4.83)

.

than dishonest targets

(M = 4.65)

=

F(l,60)

4.98),

=

.54,

p = n.s

2

(Tj

=

.

Finally, a multivariate

3

-way interaction between

target sex, severity and type of message was revealed,
F 3 54
(

=

,

7.13, p

.001

<

2

(r|

=

.27).

In the question

concerning the truthfulness of the target persons,

participants were better able to distinguish between
honest and dishonest targets when the target was female
and the behavior was low on severity compared to female

targets/high severity and male targets in general,
F 1
(

,

60

)

=

13.40, p

<

.001

2

(Tj

64

=

.18).

=

.

6

Honest
Dishonest

male

female

male

Low

High Severity

female
Severity

Figure 2: Mean truthfulness ratings as a function of
target sex, severity of transgression, and type of
message.
Different superscripts represent
statistically significant differences in the posthoc Tukey test (p < .05)
The same pattern of results was found for the dependent

variable asking participants to indicate whether they
thought the targets were being honest or dishonest,
F(l,60)

=

7.09, p

<

.01

(if

=

.11).
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Figure 3 Mean truthfulness ratings as a function of
target sex, severity of transgression, and type of
message.
Different superscripts represent
statistically significant differences in the posthoc Tukey test (p < .05)
:

Perceptions of Deceptiveness

A multivariate analysis revealed a main effect for
target sex, F(3,58)

=

11.40, p

<

.001

(if

=

.37).

Participants rated male targets as more truthful
than female targets

4.76)
<

.001

2

(rj

=

.36).

(M =

4.27),

F(l,60)

compared to female targets
.

001

(if

=

.

31)

33.19, p

Participants also identified a

greater number of males targets as honest

<

=

(M =

(M =

.52)

,

(M =

F(l,60)

.64)
=

26.95, p

.

This sex difference was qualified by a 2-way

interaction between target sex and primed cues, F(3,58)
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4.96, p

<

.01

(T|

-

.20)

.

When asked how truthful the

target persons seemed, participants rated male targets as

more truthful than female targets, especially when the

instructions contained correct cues that predict
deception, F(l,60)

=

4.62, p

<

2

.05

(r|

=

.07).

Target Person Sex

Figure 4: Mean truthfulness ratings as a function of
target sex and accuracy of primed cues. Different
superscripts represent statistically significant
differences in the post-hoc Tukey test (p < .05)

The same pattern was revealed when the participants were

asked which targets they thought were being honest about
the incident,

F(l,60)

=

10.68, p

67

<

.01

2

(rj

=

.15),

.
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Figure 5: Mean proportion of targets rated as
"Honest" as a function of target sex and accuracy of
primed cues. Different superscripts represent
statistically significant differences in the posthoc Tukey test (p < .05)

When asked the likelihood that the target person had

broken the law, women were rated as more likely to have
broken the law compared to men, but only when
participants had been given accurate cues that predict
deception, F(l,60)

=

10.68, p

68

<

.01

2

(T|

=

.15).

Accurate
Inaccurate

Target Person Sex

Figure 6: Rated likelihood that the target person
broke the law as a function of target sex and
accuracy of primed cues. Different superscripts
represent statistically significant differences in
the post-hoc Tukey test (p < .05)
.

Finally, a multivariate main effect for severity was
found,

F

(

3

,

58

=

)

7.02, p

<

.001

2

(T|

=

.27).

When target

persons were shown describing a situation low on severity
(underage drinking) participants rated them as being more

truthful

than target persons describing a high

(M = 4.64)

severity situation (drug consumption; M
=

16.67, p

<

.001

2

(T)

=

.22).

=

4.38),

F(l,60)

Targets in the high

severity condition were rated as more likely to have

broken the law

(M = 4.95)

severity condition

(M =

compared to targets in the low

4.74),
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F(l,60)

=

6.50, p

<

.01

.10)

(tj

.

Participants also identified more targets in

the low severity condition as honest

(M =

targets in the high severity condition
=

6.85,

p <

.01

2

(T|

=

.

10)

.60)

(M =

than

.55),

F(l,60)

.

Controlling for Belief Accuracy
This study attempted to manipulate the beliefs

participants have by presenting either a list of cues
that actually predict deception or a list of cues that do
not predict deception.

As seen in the previous section,

the analyses showed that the manipulation of involvement

and primed cues had no significant effect on a

participant's accuracy in detecting deception.

It is

possible that belief accuracy still had an effect on

deception detection accuracy.

Two sets of post-hoc

analyses were performed to get a better understanding
about the process of detecting deception and the role
that belief accuracy may play.

Correlational tests were performed on the belief

accuracy variable and the ratings of truthfulness.
Because the two continuous dependent variables measuring

truthfulness were significantly correlated, r
.34,

(60)

=

+

the two variables were combined into one variable in

order to run the correlation analysis.

It was found that

the dependent variables were positively correlated with

people's belief accuracy score measured during the
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initial, pre-experiment screening, r (60)

=

+

.29,

p

<

Furthermore, when calculating the correlation with

.05.

only the participants in the low involvement condition,
the magnitude of the correlation drops r (32)
= n.s.

=

+

.18,

p

On the other hand, when only participants in the

high involvement condition are used, the magnitude of the

correlation increases r(28)

=

+

.45,

p

<

.01.

These

results suggest that people rely on the beliefs they hold

when making attribution of deceptiveness, especially when
they are highly involved, and that the manipulation was
not strong enough.

Given the significance of the correlations, the
results found on the main analyses were reanalyzed on a

MANCOVA analysis controlling for
accuracy.

a

participant's belief

When holding participant's prior belief

accuracy score constant, many of the tests where there
was a significant difference in the main analyses were
not significant.

Specifically, the main effect for type

of message, which tested participants'

ability to detect

deception across all conditions, and the interaction

between severity and type of message, were not
significant when holding prior beliefs constant.
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Table

.

Multivariate analyses of variance and covariance
proportion of variance accounted for (r|
and
difference is variance accounted for when controlling for
belief accuracy. (* p < .05; ** p < .01).
4:

F scores,

2

)

MANOVA
Effect

F

(

3

58

,

MANOVA

MANCOVA
F(3, 53)

2
Tl

MANCOVA
2

Tl

2

n

dif f erenc
e

Type of Message

3

Guilt x Type of
Message

04*

.

14

.

84

01 *

.

14

13**

.

27

.

100 9**
.

Severity x Type
of Message

3

1

1

7

Sex

11.4**

.37

Severity

7.02**

.27

Sex x Primed
Cues

4

.

96*

3

5

.

83

56*

18**

01 *

.75

2

(T|

.

.

4

.20

Furthermore, effect size

57

61.8**

Sex x Severity x
Type of Message

.

.

)

08

.

06

.

.78

.

.09

.

05

17

.

10

.

.23

06

.

14

.

18

.

09

.

04

.

16

for all tests

measuring deception detection accuracy were lower when
participant's belief accuracy score was controlled for.
As Table

4

shows, belief accuracy score seems to mediate

the relationship between a person's ratings of
(j

0 Q 0 pt. iveness

dishonest.

and whether the target is being honest or

According to Baron and Kenny (1986) and Judd
72

,

.

and Kenny (1981), there are four steps to establish

mediation:

(1)

the initial variable must be correlated

with the outcome variable;

(2)

the initial variable must

be correlated with the mediator variable;

(3)

the

mediator variable must be correlated with the outcome
variable; and

(4)

controlling for the mediator variable,

the relationship between the initial variable and the

outcome variable must disappear.

Because the

relationship investigated here is a within-subjects
relationship, a full mediation analysis cannot be

performed
The ad-hoc mediation analysis presented in Table

uses the eta squared

2

(T|

performed on the data.

)

4

from the MANOVA and MANCOVA

Although

of choice for mediation analyses,

2

rj

is not the statistic

it is a measure of the

proportion of the total variability in the dependent
variable accounted for by the independent variable.
Therefore,

coefficient

it is conceptually similar to the correlation
(r)

2
which is the square root of the R a

measure of variance accounted for by the regression
model.

Another difference between this mediation test

and mediation tests described by Baron and Kenny (1986)
variable
is that the relationship between the initial
(type of message)

and the mediation variable (belief

accuracy) cannot be determined.
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Discussion
The main test of the hypothesis in this study did
not find a relationship between the cues that people

believe should predict deception, involvement, and

accuracy in detecting deception.

Nevertheless, this

study did find that people, in general, could distinguish

between honest and dishonest target persons, and the
correlations and the ad-hoc mediation analysis suggests
that there is a relationship between belief accuracy and

accuracy in detecting deception.
Furthermore, this study found that the severity of
the transgression affects the ease with which people can

detect deception.

In this study,

it was easier to detect

deception when the target person was talking about an
infringement that is perceived as relatively minor
(underage drinking) compared to a relatively severe

infringement (drug use)

Previous studies have not

investigated this factor as a moderator of the ability to
detect deception, although it shares some similarities

with the motivational impairment effect proposed by

DePaulo and colleagues (DePaulo et al
Kirkendol,

.

1988; DePaulo &

1988).

The motivational impairment hypothesis suggests that
deceive
lies told by targets that are highly motivated to
told
effectively are easier to detect by judges than lies
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by target persons who are not highly motivated
to deceive
effectively.

Since DePaulo's original study, other

researchers have replicated the findings (e.g., Forrest
and Feldman, 2000)

.

Although there are similarities, the

results of the present study show the reverse pattern,

where lies of the "highly motivated" target (high
severity) were more difficult to detect than lies of the

"low motivation"

(low severity)

target.

This leads to

the conclusion that although similar, severity of

transgression and motivation not to get caught in a lie
are not representations of the same construct.

It is

possible that people are more comfortable speaking about
underage drinking because it is a behavior that the

majority of the target's peers engage

in.

Because they

are comfortable with the topic, they might not be

motivated to mask their behaviors when deceiving,
thereby, making their deceptions easier to detect.

Another explanation for the relationship between
severity and accuracy at detecting deception is that when
speaking about drug use, which has a negative stigma

attached to

it,

targets'

anxiety level might be more

elevated than when talking about underage drinking.

This

increase in anxiety level may manifest itself in certain

behaviors that are correlated with both anxiety and
deception.

Therefore, the increased level of anxiety
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caused by the topic of conversation may be interpreted
by
the persons judging the tapes as signs of deception.

Finally,

in this study men were rated as more

truthful than women, regardless of whether they were

deceiving or not.

This is an interesting finding because

when there is a relationship between the sex of the
target and truthfulness ratings, there is usually a bias

favoring women.

The difference in ratings was especially

apparent with those "jurors" who were given a list of

behaviors that are predictive of deception.

It is

possible that because women engage in a wider variety of
nonverbal behaviors compared to men (Hall, 1984; Exline,
1963), women were rated as less truthful by the

participants when they were presented with the list of
behaviors that predict deception.

Overall, men may

perform behaviors such as increased facial expressions,
which is associated with deception, to a lesser extent
than women.

Therefore, by priming the participants to

look for specific behaviors, they might conclude that the

women shown are less truthful than the men shown.
In conclusion,

this study found some interesting

effects although the main analyses did not show any

conclusive evidence supporting the hypothesis that the
beliefs people hold concerning the behaviors that predict
people
deception are associated with how accurate those
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detecting deception.

It is possible that the

"training" method used for this study was not

sufficiently strong to cause even a temporary change in
the beliefs people hold concerning the behaviors that

predict deception.

Indirect evidence stemming from the

results of the MANCOVA where belief accuracy was

controlled for suggests that belief accuracy does have a
role to play in a person's ability to detect deception.
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CHAPTER VI

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Considering the possible applications of research on

deception detection, it is important to understand the
factors that may influence a person's ability to be an

accurate detector of deception.

The hypotheses presented

in this dissertation suggest that a combination of

beliefs, motivation, and social contexts can affect

people's accuracy in detecting deception.

Specifically,

the studies compared two models describing the process by

which people arrive at a decision as to who is deceiving
and who is being truthful.
Model)

(The Cognitive

One model

suggests that the beliefs people hold about the

cues that predict deception are directly responsible for

how people attribute deceptiveness.
(the social cognitive model)

The second model

suggests that the beliefs

people hold affect attributions of deceptiveness, but

only when those beliefs are activated.

All three

experimental studies tested these two hypotheses
In Study

I,

direct evidence for the social cognitive

and had
model was found, where judges who were suspicious

deception
accurate beliefs about the cues that predict
than people
were able to detect deception more accurately
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in other conditions.

The results of Study

I

suggest that

when people are suspicious, they attend more to the cues
they believe will predict deception.

If a suspicious

person has accurate beliefs, then he or she is very
accurate in detecting deception.

On the other hand, when

people had inaccurate beliefs and were suspicious, they

attended to the wrong cues, and therefore were not be
able to accurately distinguish between honest and

dishonest target persons.
In Study II,

the belief scale used in Study

I

was

modified and administered to 669 undergraduate students
in order to investigate the properties of the scale.

It

was found that the items on the scale were not internally

correlated, which was to be expected because the items

measure individual beliefs that are not necessarily
related to each other or affected by each other.

The

overall accuracy of people concerning the beliefs about
cues that predict deception was above chance level, but
the magnitude of the effect was not impressive.

It was

also found that people tend to have accurate beliefs
about verbal cues, while holding inaccurate beliefs about

nonverbal cues.

Men's accuracy of beliefs tended to be

around chance level, while women were relatively quite
inaccurate
accurate in terms of verbal cues, while being
in terms of nonverbal cues.

Finally, the scale mirrored

79

.

recent studies (e.g., Vrij & Semin, 1996) that have

investigated people's beliefs about the cues that predict

deception
Study III did not find any direct evidence for the
role that beliefs may have on judge's accuracy in

detecting deception.

On the other hand, suspicion

increased judge's ability to detect deception.

Some

studies on suspicion and involvement have interpreted any

effects due to judge's involvement or suspicion as

affecting the target person's behaviors, therefore making
deceit easier or more difficult to detect (Burgoon et
al

.

,

1999; Toris & DePaulo,

1985).

Because judges and

targets did not have a face-to-face interaction in this
study,

these results cannot be explained with this

interpersonal interaction model.

This points to

suspicion changing the way people view and process

information when making a decision about the

deceptiveness of a target person.
There are two possible reasons for this effect of

suspicion on accuracy, which together give indirect
evidence for the hypothesis that beliefs about cues are

related to deception detection accuracy.

First,

studies

to the
find that suspicious judges pay more attention

cues that predict deception (Zuckerman et al
DePaulo, et al

.

,

1982).

Second,
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1982;

the target persons

m

Study II were an older, more diverse sample than
college
students, and they engaged in a type of deceptive

behavior (being questioned by
)

a

"law enforcement

and context (outside the laboratory) rarely

investigated in social psychological studies.

It is

possible that the cues exhibited by this group when

deceiving were different from those measured in the
belief scale.

If this were true,

the belief scale would

not have been an accurate measure of judge's beliefs

about the cues that predict deception in this specific
case.

Taken together, these two explanations point to

suspicious people attending to an array of cues that were

probably not measured correctly or at all by the belief
accuracy scale.
Study IV attempted to teach judges either correct or
incorrect beliefs about the cues that predict deception.
The hypothesis that belief cues are associated with

accuracy in detecting deception did not receive any
direct support.

It is possible that the belief

manipulation was not strong enough to elicit
beliefs.

a change in

However, the results of this study do suggest

that belief cues mediate judge's accuracy when attempting
to detect deception.

Judge's belief accuracy measured in

a pre-screen was related to judges'

person's truthfulness.

ratings of the target

The relationship between belief
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accuracy and truthfulness ratings was especially strong
when the judge was highly involved in the task.

These

post-hoc tests show a pattern of evidence that indicate
the possible role that beliefs about cues that predict

deception have on a person's accuracy at detecting
deception
The results of these studies have helped increase

our knowledge about people as detectors of deception.
All three studies investigated different aspects of the

hypothesis that people with accurate beliefs concerning
the behaviors that predict deception are better at

detecting deception, but only when those beliefs are
activated.

Although Studies III and IV did not find

direct evidence for either of the two postulated
hypotheses, they did provide indirect evidence to suggest
that beliefs are indeed related to a person's accuracy in

detecting deception.
(Anderson et al

.

,

Because only one study to date

1999)

has investigated the relationship

between beliefs and accuracy, these studies provide
knowledge to further our understanding of the role
beliefs have in the way people attribute deception.
These studies also showed additional evidence

confirming that people, in general, can distinguish

between those who are being honest and those who are
being dishonest.

Kraut

(1980)

82

suggests that people, on

average, are accurate 60% of the time, which is not
very

impressive if we consider that the chance level is 50%.
The main effects for type of message confirmed Kraut's

observation that, in general, people can distinguish
between honest and dishonest targets.

Furthermore, the

mean difference of judges' ratings between honest and
dishonest messages on all dependent variables for all
studies was not very impressive, again replicating

Kraut's (1980) observations.
This research was designed to support the idea that

both cognitive and social factors affect the way people
attribute deception and ultimately affect people's

accuracy in detecting deception.

Traditional methods of

deception detection training have taught only part of the

necessary skills to be a good lie detector
persons do when they attempt to deceive.

-

what target

The results of

the present studies suggest that teaching methods should

also pay attention to judges' motivations, the way they

process information and what makes people suspicious.
In conclusion,

the approach to deception detection

investigated in this dissertation suggests that
contextual and social cognitive factors, in combination

with people's beliefs about the behaviors that predict
deception, jointly determine the detection accuracy of
judge.

The pattern of results for all four studies
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a

revealed some evidence for the hypothesis that people
who
have accurate beliefs about the cues that predict

deception are better at deception detection when those
beliefs are activated.

Although the pattern of results

was not as consistent with the hypothesis as expected,
the evidence does point to the importance of beliefs

about cues predictive of deception as determinants of

person's attributions of deception.

a

This evidence, by

itself, has an impact on our understanding of the process

by which people decide whether someone is being honest or
dishonest.

Besides Anderson et al

.

(1999),

no other set

of studies has found evidence suggesting a relationship

between deception detection accuracy and the beliefs
people hold about the cues that predict deception.
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APPENDIX A
1.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Study

I

To what extent do you think this person was truthful?
(Anchors:
(1) very untruthful -- (9) very truthful)
To what extent do you believe these arguments
represent what the person actually believes?

2.

1.
3.

(Anchors:

(1)

not at all --

(9)

completely)

Was this person basically honest or dishonest?
(Forced Choice: Honest -- Dishonest)

Study III.
To what extent do you think this person was truthful?
(Anchors:
(1) very untruthful -- (9) very truthful)

How likely is it that this person is carrying
contraband?
(Anchors:
(1) very unlikely -- (9) very likely)
2.

3

.

Would you stop and search this person for contraband?
(Forced Choice:

Yes -- No)

Study IV.
1.

To what extent do you think this person was truthful?
(Anchors:
(1) very untruthful -- (9) very truthful)

How likely is it that this person committed the
traffic violation?
(Anchors: (1) very unlikely -- (9) very likely)

2.

Do you believe this person is telling the truth about
the incident?
(Forced Choice: Yes -- No)
3.
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APPENDIX B

NONVERBAL CUE BELIEF QUESTIONNAIRE
For each question, think about what behaviors people not
telling the truth do MORE than people telling the truth.
How likely is it for people not telling the truth to:
(For Study I all questions were answered on a 9-point
scale anchored at (1) very unlikely and (9) very likely,
while Studies II through IV used a forced-choice version
of this questionnaire-* )-

increase eye contact with the person they are talking

1.

to?

say more "ahs" and "urns" and speech hesitations?
smile more? (r
talk more slowly? (r)
commit fewer speech errors? (r)
make more facial expressions and gestures? (r)
make many head movements (nodding, turning head side

2.
3

(r)

.

4.
5.
6.
7.

to

etc
? (r
shift their posture more?(r)
say more negative statements?
give more irrelevant information?
give more responses that are too general?
make many self references when talking? (r)
have more discrepancy in what they say?
have the pitch of their voice increase more?
have their eyes blink more?
shrug more?(r)
perform more "adaptors" such as scratching, rubbing
hands, etc.?
make more movement of their legs increases (crossing
legs etc
? (r
side,

8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13
14.
15.
16.
17.
.

18.

)

.

,

.

)

Note: items marked with

(r)
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are reversed scored.

APPENDIX C
LETTER OF COMMITMENT

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

AVIATION DEPARTMENT
RO. BOX 592075
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33159-2075

METRO-DADE*

December

3,

(305) 876-7000

1999

Mr. James A. Forrest
University of Massachusetts

Tobin Hall
Box 37710
Amherst,

MA 01003-7710

Dear Mr. Forrest:
This will confirm our co mmi tment to accommodate your request to conduct filming

at the

of your proposed study. It should be clearly understood that we
reserve the right to limit access to certain areas of the airport, as well as restrict the hours during
which the subject filming may be conducted in the airport terminal. We have a responsibility to
ensure the safety and convenience of our airport users, and must abide by local, state, and federal

Miami International Airport,

as part

security regulations governing activities at the nation’s airports.

Based on our discussions,

I

am

confident that this phase of your study will meet with success.

As

to phase II of your study, I

within the U.S.
this coining

Customs

week and

am in the process of reaching the appropriate decision maker

Service. I will

be meeting with the new Regional Director of that agency
I will be in contact with you following that

will ask for his cooperation.

meeting.

In the interest of time, I am sending you a copy of this letter via facsimile. The original of this
correspondence will reach you in due course. In the meantime, should you have any questions, please
call

me or reach me

via electronic mail.

Aan^ury Zuriarra

Deputy Director
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APPENDIX D

CORRECT AND INCORRECT LIST OF BEHAVIORS
THAT PREDICT DECEPTION

CORRECT
(1)

More speech

INCORRECT
(1)

hesitations

More eye contact with

other person

(2)

More speech errors

(2)

Smile more

(3)

More negative

(3)

Talk more slowly

statements

(4)

More facial

(4)

(5)

Give more irrelevant

expressions

information

and gestures

More "adaptors" such

(5)

(nodding)

as scratching
(6)

More blinking

(7)

More discrepancy in

(8)

More head movements

(6)

Shift their posture

more

what they say

(7)

Shrug more

Pitch of their voice

(8)

More leg movement
(crossing legs)

increases
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